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The purposes of this study were (a) to replicate 
previous research reporting actor-observer differences in 
subjects' attributions about behavioral causality, and (b) 
to manipulate the availability of causal information so that 
those actor-observer differences would be eliminated. 
An Availability Balancing List (ABL) was designed in 
an effort to modify subjects' attributions by increasing the 
availability of possible dispositional and situational 
causes of behavior. An Attribution Survey (AS) assessed 
2 
subjects' dispositional and situational attributions, and 
was administered to the treatment group 
control-group triads received only the AS. 
after the ABL: 
A pre-commitment 
condition was included in order to determine whether effects 
of the ABL were due to dissonance-related phenomena. 
Subjects were arranged in triads, randomly assigned 
to a treatment or control group, and asked to interact in a 
conversation for ten minutes. After the discussion, control 
subjects filled out the AS, and treatment-condition subjects 
completed the ABL and then the AS. Results of the study did 
not replicate expected actor-observer differences, nor was 
there any effect of the ABL. Explanations for these results 
are discussed, as well as suggestions for further research. 
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The purposes of this study were (a) to replicate actor-
observer differences in subjects' attributions about 
behavioral causality, and (b) to manipulate the availability 
of causal information so that differences in actor-observer 
attributions would be eliminated. 
The fundamental attribution error (FAE) has been 
defined as "the tendency [on the part of the observer] to 
attribute behavior exclusively to the actor's dispositions 
and to ignore powerful situational determinants of the 
behavior" (Nisbett & Ross, 1980, p. 31). Ample evidence for 
the FAE has been generated (Jones, 1979; Jones & Harris, 
1967; Miller, Jones, & Hinkle, 1981; Nisbett, Caputo, 
Legant, & Maracek, 1973; Ross, 1977; Storms, 1973), as well 
as a variety of explanations for its occurrence (see Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984, for a review). There has also been discussion 
about whether or not this tendency is an error at all 
(Funder, 1982; Hamilton, 1980; Harvey, Town & Yarkin, 1981). 
However, Harvey & Weary (1984) argue that the controversy 
surrounding empirical confirmation of the FAE's causes and 
its status as an error may be of little importance, because 
it seems clear that whatever the reasons for this tendency, 
and in whatever situations it occurs, we are dealing with 
~ 
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a "potent social judgment bias" (p. 432). In other words, 
whether dispositional factors are or are not more important 
than situational factors in accounting for behavior, there 
is a tendency to perceive them as more influential. 
Causes of the Fundamental Attribution Error. Heider (1958) 
proposed what seems to be the "primary cause" (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984) of the FAE when he suggested that people make 
dispositional attributions because "behavior in particular 
has such salient properties it tends to engulf the total 
field" (Heider, 1958, p. 54). In other words, behavior as 
the most salient feature becomes "figure" in reference to 
the field or "ground". Nisbett and Ross (1980) believe this 
is partly because situational factors may tend to be less 
eye-catching and also less interesting in comparison to 
active human beings. 
This explanation has received support from several 
studies which manipulated the salience of participating 
actor subjects, using a variety of different methods. These 
studies manipulated (a) visual prominence through the use of 
illumination and movement of the actor (McArthur & Post, 
1977) I (b) "solo" status in terms of either race or sex 
within a group (Taylor, Fiske, Close, Anderson, & Ruderman, 
1979; as cited in Nisbett & Ross, 1980), (c) the point of 
view of actors and observers by reversing their visual 
perspective through the use of videotape (Storms, 1973) and 
(d) ability of observers to see one of the actors (Taylor & 
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Fiske, 1975). In general, results of these studies indicate 
that the salience of the actor has a major effect upon 
observers' judgments about the actor's causal role: The 
more salient the actor, the more likely he or she is seen as 
a causal agent, and hence the more probable the disposi-
tional attribution. 
From this argument, a further corollary can be 
derived: If the behavior of the actor is figural for the 
observer, then the situation should be figural for the actor 
(what is in his/her perceptual field as opposed to behavior 
as ground), with resulting situational emphases for self-
raters when they pick causal candidates for their own be-
havior. Einhorn and Hogarth (1986) believe this well-
documented phenomenon occurs for the following reasons: 
Note that from the actor's perspective, his or her 
own traits are standing states, whereas situations 
are more intrusive and hence (perceived as) more 
causal. From the observer's perspective, situations 
are seen as standing states and the dispositions of 
actors are more intrusive. (p. 5) 
Because of these divergent perspectives, Jones (1976) 
believes that observers have relatively little information 
available for use when making attributions about actors' 
behavior except for the behavior's most salient features. 
But, in the case of the actor, it is likely that he or she 
will take into account a combination of both personal 
behavioral history in similar situations, as well as the 
salience of environmental causes. Because of the more equal 
consideration of both dispositional and situational factors 
4 
in actors' attributions, it would be easy to conclude that 
their attributions are closer to the "truth", but this 
conclusion would most likely be premature (Funder, 1982; 
Hamilton, 1980; Harvey, Town, & Yarkin, 1981). 
It is interesting to note that, when actors are told 
to look at their own behavior as others might, and observers 
are encouraged to empathize with actors, this actor-
observer effect can be shifted in the opposite direction for 
both the actor and observer (Gould & Sigall, 1977; Regan & 
Totten, 1975). This may suggest that behavior can be placed 
in a larger context (which includes both situational and 
dispositional constraints) when people empathize with each 
other, and that when this is possible information is 
available in addition to that which is most salient. 
The Fundamental Attribution Error and the Availability 
Heuristic. Nisbett and Ross (1980) believe that use of the 
most salient information by actors and observers as a method 
for interpreting behavioral causality may be based on 
mechanisms similar to what Tversky and Kahneman (1974) have 
termed the "availability heuristic". According to Tversky 
and Kahneman, people depend on the availability heuristic 
when they estimate the frequency or probability of an event 
on the basis of its accessibility during recall (its avail-
ability). Nisbett and Ross (1980) define availability as 
the "accessibility [of objects or events] in the processes 
of perception, memory, or construction from imagination" (p. 
5 
18). Thus, "When the size of a class is judged by the 
availability of its instances, a class whose instances are 
easily retrieved will appear more numerous than a class of 
equal frequency whose instances are less retrievable" 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, p. 
fundamental attribution error, 
1127). In the case of the 
"what is dominant when one 
observes another person is that person behaving: the person 
moves, talks, and engages in other actions that attract 
attention. Background factors, social context, roles, or 
situational pressures that may have given rise to the be-
havior are, by constrast, relatively pallid and dull and 
unlikely to be noticed when compared to the dynamic behavior 
of the actor" (Fiske & Taylor, 1984, p. 74). These factors 
all contribute to the salience of dispositional as opposed 
to situational information for the observer, and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) believe that the relative salience of events 
is one major factor in determining how available they will 
be for future recall. 
The notion that the FAE may be related to the avail-
ability heuristic 
the availability 
factors may be 
allows us to consider other ways in which 
of situational as well as dispositional 
manipulated. If the FAE is in part a 
function of the use of only the most available information 
(in this case dispositional information for observers), then 
it would seem that increasing the availability of environ-
mental events as potential causal factors should enhance 
the use of these events or characteristics as adjudged 
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causal agents. 
If the perceptual salience of the actor for the 
observer and the environment for the actor is at least 
partially responsible for actor-observer differences, then 
interventions designed to reduce these tendencies 
seek to make situational stimuli more available 
should 
for the 




and Kahneman (1974) believe that the avail-
information is 
recall can be influenced 
a function of recall and 
not only by salience but also 
that 
by 
the familiarity of the causal information to the observer 
(familiarity is influenced in part by recent occurrences of 
the causal agent in action), as well as the imaginability of 
that information (ability to imagine different cases where 
the event may be causal). With these considerations, it 
may be possible to construct a task designed to make both 
situational and dispositional information more familiar and 
more easily imaginable. This task would intensify memory 
associations between situational influences and behavioral 
causes for observers, and between dispositional influences 
and behavioral causes for actors, thereby making them more 
readily recalled. 
The Availability Balancing Li~1· For designing such a task, 
two areas of research seemed appropriate to consider: (a) 
depth of processing, and (b) influences of availability and 
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category presentation on causal judgments. Research into 
how different levels of information processing affect recall 
has revealed that information processed at the semantic 
level (in sentences) is better recalled than is information 
processed at non-semantic levels (in rhymes) (Craik & 
Tulving, 1975). This suggests that if subjects are asked to 
process causal information in sentence form, it might make 
this information more easily recalled. 
From the judgment and decision-making literature came 
clues which were useful in deciding how to structure and 
present causal information. Fischhoff, Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, in their 1978 study on the use of fault trees 
for determining potential causes of a car's failure to 
start, found that presenting potential causal agents to 
subjects in explicit functional categories (such as "battery 
charge insufficient" or "ignition system defective") in-
creased the perceived importance of those categories. For 
the purposes of the present study, these findings suggested 
that if subjects were presented with categories divided into 
smaller segments describing potential causes for behavior 
(in this case both situational and dispositional factors), 
their perceptions of the importance of the material in the 
categories might increase. 
In order to attenuate the FAE and its corollary in 
self-raters, an Availability Balancing List (ABL) was 
designed to capitalize on both of the above findings: It 
combined a semantic processing strategy (generating written 
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examples) with a guided breakdown (in the form of functional 
categories i.e., situational and dispositional) of possible 
causes for behavior. An example of a dispositional category 
is "The intelligence and/or personal skills of (the rated 
person)"; an example of a situational category is "The fact 
that this is an experiment, including the presence of the 
investigator". Both dispositional and situational explan-
ations for behavior were included in the ABL in an effort 
(a) to modify the attributions of both other-raters and 
self-raters, (b) to obtain data on an unbiased instrument, 
and (c) to reduce demand characteristics (Orne, 1962), i.e., 
to avoid subjects' perceiving the goal of the experiment and 
complying with it to please the experimenter. 
It could be posited that the ABL might produce its 
effect (making self-raters' attributions more dispositional 
and other-raters' attributions more situational) because 
of processes similar to those found in the study of 
dissonance phenomena. Dissonance is produced when people 
engage in behaviors and thoughts which run counter to their 
belief systems. In such situations, attitudes are often 
subsequently changed to match these dissonant behaviors and 
thoughts, and in some cases, subjects cannot even remember 
their initial attitudes (i.e., their beliefs before counter-
attitudinal behavior or thoughts were induced) (Bern & 
McConnell, 1970; Wixon & Laird, 1976). It is possible that 
mechanisms similiar to these could be involved in changes 
produced by the ABL, because subjects might be generating 
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examples which run counter to their beliefs about what 
causes behavior. However, because the ABL contained cate-
gories 
tional 
that reflected both dispositional as well as situa-
determinants of behavior, it was hoped that by 
asking subjects to generate examples that illustrated their 
established beliefs about the causes of behavior as well as 
alternative causal explanations, counterattitudinal effects 
would be lessened. In addition, a pre-commitment condition 
in the study attempted to address attitude change produced 
by counterattitudinal behavior, by inserting instructions 
designed to reduce potential dissonance (subjects were told 
that they could revise their responses later, that they were 
not final). 
To examine these questions, undergraduate students 
were asked to have short conversations (10 minutes) in 
triads, for the purpose of getting to know one another. 
This task was chosen as a partial replication of the 
"getting acquainted" conversation used by Storms (1973). 
After the conversation, the treatment-group triads were 
asked to generate examples of causal agents listed on the 
ABL. Finally, all triads were asked to answer questions on 
an Attribution Survey (AS), patterned after the survey used 
by Storms (1973). The survey used a nine-point scale (as 
did Storms) to assess subjects' attributions to disposi-
tional and situational explanations of the rated person's 
(either self or other) behavior, the scale points ranging 
from one as "extremely important" to nine as "extremely 
10 
unimportant." Five dimensions were studied along both 
situational and dispositional lines, four of which came 
from the Storms (1973) study. 
measure were (a) friendliness, 
Those from Storms' response 
(b) talkativeness, (c) 
nervousness, and (d) dominance, and the final dimension (not 
from Storms) was (e) listening (skills). When the data 
were tabulated, an overall percentage of situational attri-
butions was calculated for each individual questionnaire. 
These were the final scores used for comparisons during data 
analysis. 
The Present Study. 
present study: (a) 
Several hypotheses were tested in the 
that observers' attributions about 
others differ from actors self-attributions (replication of 
previous research into actor-observer differences), (b) that 
observers' attributions about others differ from observers' 
attributions about others in a pre-commitment condition 
(non-dissonance producing) , (c) that the use of the Avail-
ability Balancing List has the effect of increasing situa-
tional attributions in other-raters and that it may 
influence dispositional ratings in self-raters, and (d) that 
the ABL has a differential effect on observers' attributions 
of others, pre-commitment condition observers' attributions 
of others, and actors' attributions of self. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOD 
Subjects. Subjects were 32 male and 46 female undergraduate 
students in Introductory Psychology and Human Development 
courses at Portland State University, ranging in age from 18 
to 44 years. Subjects were formed into 26 mixed-sex triads 
on the basis of scheduling convenience. 
Materials. Initial materials consisted of a page requesting 
informed consent for participation in a research study (see 
Appendix A) and Instructions to Participants, patterned 
after those in Storms' (1973) study, which briefly describe 
the form the conversation between the three participants 
should take (see Appendix B). 
The Availability Balancing List (ABL) (a) consisted of 
groups of personal (dispositional) and situational 
characteristics (such as the rated person's intelligence, 
and the fact that that subjects were involved in an experi-
ment, respectively), and (b) asked each treatment-group 
participant to give examples of how one or more characteris-
tic in each set might have influenced the rated person's 
behavior (see Appendices c, D, and E). 
In an effort to determine if dissonance phenomena were 
in fact involved in any effect produced by the ABL, the pre-
commitment-condition ABL contained a statement 
12 
which 
informed subjects that "You will have an opportunity to look 
them [your answers] over later and decide if you want to 
replace or change any before they are considered final." 
The ABL's in the other conditions did not contain this 
statement. If in fact dissonance-type phenomena were 
responsible for effects produced by the ABL, results of 
subjects attributions in this condition should be 
significantly different from the other-rater group that 
expected their answers to be final (and would therefore be 
expected to make dissonance-reducing attributions). 
(Appendices C, D, and E contain complete ABL's for other-
raters, pre-commitment condition other-raters, and self-
raters, respectively). 
The Attribution Survey (AS) was a modified version of 
the dependent measure used by Storms (1973). This assessed 
subjects' dispositional versus situational attributions 
about their conversation partners or themselves (see 
Appendices F, G, and H for Attribution Surveys for other-
raters, pre-commitment other-raters, and self-raters, 
respectively) • 
Questionnaires (both the AS and the ABL) were color 
coded (Blue, Yellow, and Gray) so participants could distin-
guish which member of the triad they were supposed to rate, 
and questionnaires were distributed while all members of the 
triad were present so colors would not be confused. The 
pre-commitment condition other-rater received the gray 
13 
questionnaire and was termed Person G, the self-rater re-
ceived the blue questionnaire and was termed Person B, and 
the other-rater received the yellow questionnaire and was 
termed Person Y. All three members of the triad, whether in 
the self or other conditions, rated the person with the blue 
questionnaire (Person B) (see TABLE I) • 
TABLE I 
TYPES AND COLORS OF AVAILABILITY BALANCING 
LISTS AND THEIR TARGET SUBJECTS 
ABL Color Tl,Ee of ABL Rated Subject 
Blue Self-rater Blue 
Yellow Other-rater Blue 
Gray pre-commitment other-rater Blue 
Finally, a Personal Data Form requested information 
about age, sex, level of schooling, major field of study, 
and number of psychology courses completed (see Appendix I). 
Procedure. Subjects were recruited from undergraduate 
courses at Portland State University, primarily on the basis 
of their ability to come at times which made it possible to 
form triads. 
Triads were randomly assigned to either the control 
group or the treatment group before they arrived. Upon 
arrival they entered a room with three comfortable chairs 
and three tables. Chairs were arranged in circular fashion, 
and the tables were situated at the back of the room. On 
14 
each chair rested a clipboard and pen, with (a) the Instruc-
tions to Participants page and (b) the Informed Consent 
sheet. Subjects entered the room and were told to "Have a 
seat where you like." The experimenter then reviewed the 
Instructions to Participants, and explained that the task 
was to engage in a short conversation (10 min) designed for 
them to "get to know each other", and told participants 
that they could "Talk about anything you wish, perhaps 
starting with your names, where you live, and other informa-
tion you may think is pertinent." Subjects were also told 
that they would be asked to fill out a questionnaire after 
the conversation regarding their experiences during the 
exchange. The experimenter then reviewed the Informed 
Consent page, asked if there were any questions, and re-
quested 
At 
that subjects give their consent for participation. 
this point, the experimenter collected the clip-
boards with the Informed Consent pages, left the room, and 
subjects started the conversation. During the following 10-
minute period, the experimenter randomly assigned each sub-
ject in the triad to one of the three questionnaire condi-
tions. 
After the 10-minute period, the investigator returned 
with questionnaires attached to the clipboards and asked 
treatment-group triads to fill out the ABL followed by the 
AS. Subjects were told they could use either the tables or 
remain seated where they were and use the clipboards to fill 
out the questionnaires. The experimenter went over the 
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directions for filling out the ABL with each group, and told 
them to "please answer all of the questions in their 
arranged order and then turn your questionnaire over. Don't 
worry about making corrections or additions as I am inter-
ested in your first impressions." When all subjects in each 
treatment-group triad were finished with both the ABL and 
the AS, they were asked to make any additions or corrections 
to the ABL on the back of their questionnaire. 
Subjects in the control group were given the instruc-
tions and asked to fill out the Attribution Survey 
immediately after the 10-minute period. All participants, 
when finished with the Attribution Survey, were asked to 
fill out the Personal Information Form. Finally, all were 
thanked for their participation, debriefed about the nature 
of the study, and asked to not speak about the study with 
others for a two-week period. 
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
A multivariate analysis-of-variance (MANOVA) was used 
to analyze this mixed design. The ABL/non-ABL difference 
was the grouping factor (i.e., between-subjects), and 
Persons was the repeated measures factor. The repeated-
measures factor was treated as a multivariate profile. The 
sampling variable in the analysis was triads. This 
approach is preferable to the ANOVA approach because the 
subjects-within-groups-by-trials effects are equivalent for 
all treatment and repeated measures combinations (SYSTAT 
Manual, 1985, p. 215). 
A univariate F-test revealed no difference in the 
critical analysis between self vs. other attributions in 
the control group, F(l, 12) = 0.128, n.s. Such a differ-
ence, if found, would have replicated previous research on 
actor-observer differences and provided an indication of the 
presence of the phenomenon to be modified. Mean percentage 
of situational attributions for self and other attributions 
in the control group were 0.468 and 0.478, respectively, and 
standard deviations were 0.055 (self) and 0.077 (other). In 
addition, a univariate F-test revealed no difference between 
the other condition vs. the pre-commitment other condition 
attributions in the control group, F(l, 12) = 2.575, n.s. 
17 
A univariate F-test in the self vs. other profile 
revealed no difference between the ABL condition and the 
non-ABL condition, F(l, 24) = 2.598, n.s. Similarly, a 
univariate F-test on the other vs. pre-commitment other 
condition profile showed no difference bsetween the ABL and 
non-ABL condition, F(l, 24) = .382, n.s. 
In a further attempt to obtain the actor-observer 
differences that would indicate the presence of the phenome-
non of interest, a discriminant analysis was performed on 
the test questions (see Table II for results) to determine 
whether some items in the Attribution Survey might be better 
at distinguishing this difference than others. This analy-
sis showed the talkativeness dimension (Items 2 and 7) to be 
closer to distinguishing the actor-observer difference than 
other dimensions. A test of the other vs. self groups in 
the control condition was thus made using only these items. 
Again, no significant difference was found, F(l, 12) = 
0.196, n.s. Moreover, further analyses using just these 
items showed no difference in the ABL by self vs. other 
attributions F(l, 24) = .880, n.s., and no difference in the 
ABL by other vs. non-dissonance condition other-attri-
butions, K(l, 24) = .037, n.s. 
Normal probability plots of residuals revealed no 
substantial departure from normality in the above analyses, 
and plots of residuals against estimates showed no sig-
nificant departure from homogeneity of variance. Analysis 
of leverage revealed no variance, indicating that there were 
18 
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The expected actor-observer difference, in the form of 
the FAE for observers and a tendency toward situationally-
directed attributions for self-raters, was not obtained in 
the control condition, although both actors and observers 
tended to make slightly more dispositional attributions than 
situational. At first glance, this appears to contradict a 
large body of previous research (Jones, 1976; Jones, 1979; 
Jones & Harris, 1967; Miller, Jones & Hinkle, 1981; Nisbett, 
1973; Ross, 1977; Storms, 1973). 
An overall effect of the ABL on subjects' attributions 
was originally expected as well. This would have provided 
evidence for the relation of actor-observer differences to 
the availability of information, by showing that when 
situational data are made more available to observer-raters, 
and dispositional data are made more available to self-
raters, subjects are more likely to make use of this infor-
mation when making causal attributions. 
No ABL main effect was obtained, but there was no 
reason to expect such an effect because in this group there 
was no overall bias toward either dispositional or sit-
uational factors. In addition, no ABL-by-Person interaction 
was obtained (that is, there was no difference between self 
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vs. other or between other vs. precommitment other in the 
ABL conditions). Again, there was no reason to expect such 
a difference because no person simple-effect was present in 
the control condition. Any ABL effect under these circum-
stances would be unexpected, as the ABL was designed to 
equalize or balance attributions in conditions where actor-
observer differences exist, and in this case, the presence 
of any such difference was clearly not detected. 
In an effort to make sense of the failure to repli-
cate the usual actor-observer attributional differences in 
the present study, literature relating to conditions where 
actor-observer differences were reduced or eliminated was 
inspected. Several types of circumstances have been 
discussed in reports of recent research which seem to have 
some relevance to findings of the present study. Four merit 
consideration. 
One, when the salience of the actor's environment is 
greater than the salience of the actor, behavior may be 
attributed (by the observer) relatively more situationally 
than when environmental salience is low (McArthur & Post, 
1977). 
Two, when an actor's behavior is actually disposition-
ally based (he/she has always behaved this way in the past 
and intends to do so in the future) , the actor is likely to 
make more dispositionally-based attributions (Monson & 
Snyder, 1977). 
Three, when the wording of "situational" questions is 
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ambiguous, people may use these categories when they aren't 
sure what caused the behavior, increasing the relative 
number of situationally-based attributions and creating 
actor-observer differences. When situational factors are 
clearly specified and ambiguous attributions are assessed 
separately, actor-observer differences have been shown to 
disappear (Goldberg, 1981) (It should be noted that this 
runs counter to the notion that it is dispositional rather 
than situational categories that are revised). 
Four, when observers are given instructions to empa-
thize with actors, observers make attributions that are 
"relatively more situational and less dispositional than 
attributions provided by standard observers" (Regan & 
Totten, 1975, p. 850: Gould & Sigall, 1977). 
In the McArthur and Post (1977) study, 
salience of the actor's environment (the 
increasing the 
other people 
present) on videotape by varying brightness, motion, pattern 
complexity (of clothing) and contextual novelty, was found 
to increase the number of situationally-based attributions. 
It is unlikely that the present study differed from Storms' 
(1973) study in this respect. If the salience of the exper-
imental room is considered, it might be argued that, because 
the room was relatively small with three chairs set up in 
front and three tables set up in back (unusual arrangements 
for furniture under normal conditions), the environment was 
made more salient. However, the environment in Storms' study 
consisted of two actor-conversants being observed by two 
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subjects uninvolved in the conversation, and two video 
cameras trained on the actors. This would seem to present a 
much more salient environment than the furniture arrangement 
of the present study and the conversation between the three 
participants taking place without the presence of the exper-
imenter and yet, actor-observer differences were verified in 
the Storms study. 
Monson and Snyder (1977) argue that, under conditions 
where the actor is aware that his or her behavior has been 
stable in similar situations and that it will continue to 
remain stable during similar experiences in the future, 
actors will tend to make attributions in a dispositional 
rather than a situational direction. This seems to be a 
possible explanation for these results, but only because 
there were no data available in the present study to rule it 
out. Yet, there seems to be no reason to believe subjects 
in this experiment would have greater insight into or exper-
ience with their dispositions, or more stable cross-
situational behavior, than other groups of undergraduate 
students in similar studies. This type of insight or cross-
situational consistency would have to be present if the 
results were to be explained in this way. 
Goldberg (1981) showed that people may make use of 
ambiguous "situational" categories when they are not sure of 
the causes of the behavior they are trying to explain, 
creating actor-observer differences. He found that if 
situational explanations were made clear in the wording of 
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the questionnaire, and unambiguous attributions were 
assessed separately, these differences were eliminated. This 
cannot account for the difference between the present exper-
iment and Storms' (1973) classic study since the questions 
used were virtually identical. 
Probably the most likely explanation for this study's 
failure to replicate the usual actor-observer attributional 
difference may have to do with results from both Regan and 
Totten's (1975) as well as Gould and Sigall's (1977) 
studies, which showed that establishing empathy in observers 
for the actors they were watching produced relatively more 
situational attributions (and less dispositional attri-
butions) than those produced by observers in other studies. 
In support of this possibility, it is interesting to note 
that Storms' (1973) results seem to differ from the present 
study in the observer groups, not the actor groups. In the 
current study, both observers' and actors' attributions were 
similar to actors' attributions in Storms. 
One major procedural difference which stands out in 
the present study when compared with other studies (Jones & 
Harris, 1967; Miller, Jones, & Hinkle, 1981; Nisbett, 
Caputo, Legant, & Maracek, 1973; Storms, 1973 to name a 
few), is that none of the observers in these other studies 
were engaged in the same situation or task as the actors. 
In the present study, both observers and actors were 
participants in the conversational situation. It is 
possible that because observers understood what it was like 
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to participate in such a situation, they were able to 
empathize with the people about whom they were asked to make 
attributions. If this was the case, it is likely that those 
observers would make relatively more situational, and less 
dispositional attributions, therefore eliminating potential 
actor-observer differences. 
Considering this as a reasonable possibility, future 
research might include a replication of this study with one 
change: Instead of the pre-commitment condition other-rater 
participant, a non-participant other-rater could be substi-
tuted. In this case the difference between the participant 
other-rater and the non-participant other-rater could be 
compared. If empathy is a factor in eliminating actor-
observer differences in this study, then the non-participant 
observer should make more dispositional attributions than 
the participant observer, and the participant observer's 
attributions should not differ from the self-rater's. 
In conclusion, the present study failed to replicate 
the well-documented actor-observer attributional difference. 
This raises questions about how the actor-observer 
ence has been obtained in the past, particularly 




it suggests that this phenomenon may be a consistent result 
only in experimental settings where actors and observers 
are kept from engaging in the same task (and therefore from 
empathizing with each other). This would certainly limit 
the generalizability and applicability of these types of 
experimental findings to real-world situations. 
25 
Additional 
research addressing these questions is necessary, and might 
provide more concrete information about the circumstances 
under which such a difference is, and is not, produced. 
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APPENDIX A 
INFORMED CONSENT SHEET 
I, , hereby agree to serve 
as a subject in a research project on Interpersonal 
Relationships conducted by Carla A. Green. 
I understand that the study involves talking with two 
other people and filling out a questionnaire. 
I understand that possible risks to me associated with 
this study are loss of time or interest during participa-
tion. 
It has been explained to me that the purpose of 
the study is to learn about interpersonal relationships. 




in this study, but my participation may help 
knowledge which may benefit others in the 
Carla A. Green has offered to answer any questions I 
may have about the study. I have been assured that all 
information I give will be kept confidential and that the 
identity of all subjects will remain anonymous. 
I understand that I am free to withdraw from partici-
pation in this study at any time without jeopardizing my 









If you experience problems that are the result of your 
participation in this study, please contact Director of 
Sponsored Research, Office of Graduate Studies and Research, 
105 Neuberger Hall, Portland State University, 229-3423. 
APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS 
This is a study in an area of social psychology called 
Interpersonal Relations. More specifically, I'm interested 
in people getting to know each other. The three of you will 
be having a short first conversation with each other, 
lasting about ten minutes. You may talk about anything you 
wish, perhaps starting with your names, where you live and 
other information you may think is pertinent. At the end of 
your discussion I will ask you to fill out a questionnaire 
regarding your experiences in the conversation. 
APPENDIX C 
AVAILABILITY BALANCING LIST FOR OTHER-RATERS 
For the purposes of this questionnaire, please use the 
following abbreviations: 
PERSON B = Person with blue questionnaire 
PERSON G = Person with gray questionnaire 
The following are characteristics which may have had 
an influence or effect on the behavior of your conversation 
partners. 
For each numbered item, provide an example 
or more of the characteristics named influenced 
behavior. (You may give short or longer answers, 
you do not exceed the space provided for you.) 
of how one 
Person B's 
as longas 
Here are two samples of what your answers might be like: 
a) Person B's political beliefs. 
example: Person B seemed to have very strong beliefs about 
the differences between Democrats and Republicans, and when 
she found out I was a Democrat, she acted as if I wasn't 
worth talking to anymore, and she ignored me. 
b) Your own political beliefs. 
example: My own political beliefs can be considered 
somewhat strong and I've been told that I can be abrasive 
about them at times. It is possible that my abrasiveness 
could have made Person B less willing to converse with me. 
INFLUENTIAL PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSON B 
1. Person B's Intelligence and/or Personal Skills. 




3. Person B's specific Attitudes, Motivation, and/or Mood. 
4. The Sex and/or Age of Person B. 
5. Person B's cultural background (i.e. religion, race, 
and/or ethnic group) • 
6. Person B's level of education, social class and/or 
occupation. 
INFLUENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXPERIMENT 
~~~~~ ~~~~~~~- -- -~ 
7. The fact that this is an Experiment, including the 
presence of the investigator. 
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8. The Topics of conversation, and the fact that you were 
told to "Get to Know" each other. 
9. The lack of Previous Association between the three of 
you. 
INFLUENTIAL PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF YOURSELF AND PERSON 
G ON THE BEHAVIOR OF PERSON B ~ ~-
10. Your own and Person G's Intelligence and/or Personal 
Skills. 
11. Your own and Person G's general Character, Personality, 
and/or Personal Style. 
12. Your own and Person G's specific Attitudes, Motivation, 
and/or Mood. 
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13. Your own and Person G's Sex and/or Age. 
14. Your own and Person G's Behavior. 
15. Your own and Person G's cultural background (i.e. 
religion, race, and/or ethnic group). 
16. Your own and Person G's level of education, social class 
and/or occupation. 
INFLUENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SETTING ---
17. Time of day and/or Temperature of the room. 
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18. Comfortableness and Layout of the room and its 
Furnishings. 
19. Room Lighting and Color of the Room and/or Furnishings 
APPENDIX D 
AVAILABILITY BALANCING LIST FOR PRE-COMMITMENT OTHER-RATERS 
For the purposes of this questionnaire, please use the 
following abbreviations: 
PERSON B = Person with blue questionnaire 
PERSON Y = Person with yellow questionnaire 
The following are characteristics which may have had an 
influence or effect on the behavior of your conversation 
partners. 
For each numbered item, provide an example of how one 
or more of the characteristics named influenced Person B's 
behavior. (You may give short or longer answers, as long--a5 
you do not exceed the space provided for you.) The examples 
you generate now will be tentative. You will have an 
opportunity to look them over later and decide if you want 
to replace or change any before they are considered final. 
Here are two samples of what your answers might be like: 
a) Person B's political beliefs. 
example: Person B seemed to have very strong beliefs about 
the differences between Democrats and Republicans, and when 
she found out I was a Democrat, she acted as if I wasn't 
worth talking to anymore, and she ignored me. 
b) Your own political beliefs. 
example: My own political beliefs can be considered 
somewhat strong and I've been told that I can be abrasive 
about them at times. It is possible that my abrasiveness 
could have made Person B less willing to converse with me. 
INFLUENTIAL PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSON B 
1. Person B's Intelligence and/or Personal Skills. 
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2. Person B's general Character, 
Personal Style. 
Personality, and/or 
3. Person B's specific Attitudes, Motivation, and/or Mood. 
4. The Sex and/or Age of Person B. 
5. Person B's cultural background (i.e. religion, race, 
and/or ethnic group). 
6. Person B's level of education, social class and/or 
occupation. 
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INFLUENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXPERIMENT ---
7. The fact that this is an Experiment, including the 
presence of the investigator. 
8. The Topics of conversation, and the fact that you were 
told to "Get to Know" each other. 
9. The lack of Previous Association between the three of 
you. 
INFLUENTIAL PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF YOURSELF AND PERSON 
Y ON THE BEHAVIOR OF PERSON B - ~-
10. Your own and Person Y's Intelligence and/or Personal 
Skills. 
11. Your own and Person Y's general Character, Personality, 
and/or Personal Style. 
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12. Your own and Person Y's specific Attitudes, Motivation, 
and/or Mood. 
13. Your own and Person Y's Sex and/or Age. 
14. Your own and Person Y's Behavior. 
15. Your own and Person Y's cultural background (i.e. 
religion, race, and/or ethnic group). 
16. Your own and Person Y's level of education, social class 
and/or occupation. 
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INFLUENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SETTING ---
17. Time of day and/or Temperature of the room. 
18. Comfortableness and Layout of the room and its 
Furnishings. 
19. Room Lighting and Color of the Room and/or Furnishings 
APPENDIX E 
AVAILABILITY BALANCING LIST FOR SELF-RATERS 
For the purposes of this questionnaire, please use the 
following abbreviations: 
PERSON Y = Person with yellow questionnaire 
PERSON G = Person with gray questionnaire 
The following are characteristics which may have had an 
influence or effect on your behavior during the 
conversation. Please consider only your behavior when 
filling out the questionnaire. 
For each numbered item, provide an example of how 
one or more of the characteristics named influenced your own 
behavior. (You may give short or longer answers, as long as 
you do not exceed the space provided for you.) 
Here are two samples of what your answers might be like: 
a) Your own political beliefs. 
example: My own political beliefs can be considered 
somewhat strong and I've been told that I can be abrasive 
about them at times. It is possible that my abrasiveness 
could have made Person Y and Person G less willing to 
converse with me. 
b) Person Y and/or Person G's political beliefs. 
example: Person G seemed to have very strong beliefs about 
the differences between Democrats and Republicans, and when 
she found out I was a Democrat, she acted as if I wasn't 
worth talking to anymore, and she ignored me. 
YOUR OWN INFLUENTIAL PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Your Intelligence and/or Personal Skills. 
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2. Your general Character, Personality, and/or Personal 
Style. 
3. Your specific Attitudes, Motivation, and/or Mood. 
4. Your Sex and/or Age. 
5. Your cultural background (i.e. religion, race, and/or 
ethnic group). 
6. Your level of education, social class and/or occupation. 
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INFLUENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EXPERIMENT ---
7. The fact that this is an Experiment, including the 
presence of the investigator. 
8. The Topics of conversation, and/or the fact that you were 
told to "Get to Know" each other. 
9. The lack of Previous Association between the three of 
you. 
INFLUENTIAL PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSON Y AND PERSON 
G ON YOUR OWN BEHAVIOR - - --
10. Person Y's and/or Person G's Intelligence and/or 
Personal Skills. 
11. Person Y's and/or Person G's general Character, 
Personality, and/or Personal Style. 
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12. Person Y's and/or Person G's specific Attitudes, 
Motivation, and/or Mood. 
13. Person Y's and/or Person G's Sex and/or Age. 
14. Person Y's and/or Person G's behavior. 
15. Person Y's and/or Person G's cultural background (i.e. 
religion, race, and/or ethnic group). 
16. Person Y's and/or Person G's level of education, social 
class, and/or occupation. 
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INFLUENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SETTING ---
17. Time of day and or Temperature of the room. 
18. Comfortableness and Layout of the room and its 
Furnishings. 
19. Room Lighting and Color of the Room and/or Furnishings. 
APPENDIX F 
ATTRIBUTION SURVEY FOR OTHER-RATERS 
For the purposes of this questionnaire, 
remember the following abbreviations: 
please 
PERSON B = Person with blue questionnaire 
PERSON G = Person with gray questionnaire 
When you fill out the following questionnaire, please 
consider only the behavior of Person B. For each three 
part question on the following pages, please rate the 
behavior of Person B along the following dimensions: 
friendliness, talkativeness, nervousness, dominance and 
listening. Then for each of these five behaviors, indicate 
how much influence you think the following factors had in 
causing that behavior. 
Please circle the number which most closely 
describes your feelings about your conversation partner 
(Person B); ones are approximately equal across all 
questions as are nines etc. 




1 2 3 
b. How important were 




1 2 3 
4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unfriendly 
personal and personality character-
in causing his/her friendly, warm 
4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
c. How important were characteristics of the situation (in-












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
non-talkative 
b. How important were personal and personality character-
istics of Person B in causing his/her talkative behavior? 
extremely 
important 
1 2 3 
c. How important were 




1 2 3 
4 
4 
5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
characteristics of the 
Person G) in causing 
situation 
his/her 
5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
3a. To what extent did Person B behave in a nervous manner? 
extremely 
nervous 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
comfortable 
b. How important were personal and personality characteris-




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
c. How important were characteristics of the situation 
(including yourself and Person G) in causing his/her nervous 
or comfortable behavior? 
extremely 
important 




4a. To what extent did Person B behave in a dominant manner? 
extremely 
dominant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
non-dominant 
b. How important were personal and personality characteris-
tics of Person B in causing his/her dominant behavior? 
extremely 
important 
1 2 3 
c. How important were 




1 2 3 
4 
4 
5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
characteristics of the 
Person G) in causing 
situation 
his/her 
5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 




2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
bad listener 
b. How important were personal and personality characteris-
tics of Person B in causing his/her listening behavior? 
extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
c. How important were characteristics of the situation 








ATTRIBUTION SURVEY FOR PRE-COMMITMENT OTHER-RATERS 
For the purposes of this questionnaire, 
remember the following abbreviations: 
please 
PERSON B = Person with blue questionnaire 
PERSON Y = Person with yellow questionnaire 
When you fill out the following questionnaire, please 
consider only the behavior of Person B. For each three 
part question on the following pages, please rate the 
behavior of Person B along the following dimensions: 
friendliness, talkativeness, nervousness, dominance and 
listening. Then for each of these five behaviors, indicate 
how much influence you think the following factors had in 
causing that behavior. 
Please circle the number which most closely 
describes your feelings about your conversation partner 
(Person B); ones are approximately equal across all 
questions as are nines etc. 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unfriendly 
b. How important were personal and personality character-




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
c. How important were characteristics of the situation 
(including yourself and Person Y) in causing his/her 
friendly, warm behavior? 
extremely 
important 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
non-talkative 
b. How important were personal and personality characteris-
tics of Person B in causing his/her talkative behavior? 
extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
c. How important were characteristics of the situation 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
3a. To what extent did Person B behave in a nervous manner? 
extremely 
nervous 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
comfortable 
b. How important were personal and personality characteris-




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
c. How important were characteristics of the situation 
(including yourself and Person Y) in causing his/her nervous 
or comfortable behavior? 
extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
4a. To what extent did Person B behave in a dominant manner? 
extremely 
dominant 




b. How important were personal and personality characteris-
tics of Person B in causing his/her dominant behavior? 
extremely 
important 
1 2 3 
c. How important were 




1 2 3 
4 
4 
5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
characteristics of the 
Person Y) in causing 
situation 
his/her 
5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 




2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
bad listener 
b. How important were personal and personality character-
istics of Person B in causing his/her listening behavior? 
extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
c. How important were characteristics of the 










ATTRIBUTION SURVEY FOR SELF-RATERS 
For the purposes of this questionnaire, 
remember the following abbreviations: 
please 
PERSON Y = Person with yellow questionnaire 
PERSON G = Person with gray questionnaire 
When you fill out the following questionnaire, please 
consider just your own behavior. For each three part 
question on the following pages, please rate your behavior 
along the following dimensions: friendliness, 
talkativeness, nervousness, dominance and listening. Then 
for each of these five behaviors, indicate how much 
influence you think the following factors had in causing 
that behavior. 
Please circle the number which most closely 
describes your feelings about your behavior; ones are 
approximately equal across all questions as are nines etc. 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unfriendly 
b. How important were your personal and personality 
characteristics in causing your friendly, warm behavior? 
extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
c. How important were characteristics of the situation 
(including Person G and Person Y) in causing your friendly, 
warm behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely extremely 
important unimportant 
2a. To what extent did you behave in a talkative manner? 




b. How important were your personal and personality 
characteristics of in causing your talkative behavior? 
extremely 
important 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
c. How important were characteristics of the 






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 












4 5 6 7 8 
were your personal and 
causing your nervous or 









c. How important were characteristics of the situation 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
unimportant 
4a. To what extent did you behave in a dominant manner? 
extremely 
dominant 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely 
non-dominant 
b. How important were your personal and personality 
characteristics in causing your dominant behavior? 
extremely 
important 




c. How important were characteristics of the situation 
(including Person G and Person Y) in causing your dominant 
behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely extremely 
important unimportant 
Sa. To what extent did you behave as a good listener? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely extremely 
good listener bad listener 
b. How important were your personal and personality 
characteristics in causing your listening behavior? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
extremely extremely 
important unimportant 
c. How important were characteristics of the situation 
(including Person G and Person Y) in causing your listening 
behavior? 




PERSONAL DATA FORM 
It would be very helpful if you would provide the 
following information: 
Age: ____ _ 
Sex: -----
Year in school (if student): 
---------~ 
Major field of study: 
Approximately 
taken? 
how many psychology classes 
Have you done any graduate work? --------
If so, in what area? 
~---------------
How many years? 
~------------------
have you 
